Sculpted Spaces

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KASKcinema Gent, 27 September 2012 20:30

From the 19th century panoramas and Lumière’s single-shot studies to the work of Larry Gottheim, Rose Lowder or James Benning: landscapes have always taken up an important place in the (pre)cinematographic imagination. In turn the relation between cinema and landscape is part of a much longer history of fragmenting place and space, as an invitation to organized voyages inside the frame. The recent video work of Sophie Nys and Aglaia Konrad also solicit coordinated perspectives on the composition and texture of specific places: the ‘Parque do Flamengo’ in Rio de Janeiro and the Apuanian Alps in Toscany; for one the most ambitious creation of landscape architect Roberto Burle Marx, for the other the excisions of the marble out of which Michelangelo once sculpted his masterpieces. What both works make visible, under the surface of ruin and chaos, is what ultimately appears once the landscape is sculpted: architecture.

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Sophie Nys
Parque do Flamengo

2012, video, color, stereo sound, 16:9, non spoken, 45’

Drawn by her interest in history and architecture and the ambiguity which is emerging from modernist utopias, the Belgian artist Sophie Nys left in January 2011 for Rio de Janeiro to shoot the film Parque do Flamengo. From this a semi-documentary resulted whose main character is the Parque do Flamengo, a park designed by the landscape architect Roberto Burle Marx between 1954 and 1959. Simultaneously a painter, sculptor, poet and botanist, Roberto Burle Marx is known worldwide as one of the greatest landscape architects of the twentieth century. The film by Sophie Nys is a 45 minute tracking shot and represents the whole of the park as an isolated entity. The space is crossed from A to Z at a walking pace. As a stroll, the route follows the curved and sensual line of the park. The film is a physical and artistic portrait of the place, a recording of a living space between culture and nature. At Sophie Nys’s request, composer and musician Arto Lindsay composed an original sound track based on the plants that appear in the park. Faithful to her artistic practice, Sophie Nys develops a project which, behind a minimalist conceptual rigour, succeeds in revealing and eluding both the poetry and the absurdity of nature in a frame. Never objective, but always precise, the works of Sophie Nys evade historical and scientific linearity in favour of an approach based on intuitive research and free associations.

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Aglaia Konrad
Concrete & Samples III Carrara

2010, 16mm transferred to video, color, 4:3, no sound, 19′

Concrete & Samples I, II, III is a series of 16mm films on sculptural architecture. What the buildings and site in all films have in common is the idea of ‘architecture as sculpture’ and a very distinct use of concrete that seem to depart from the free form of the whole in a sculptural manner. In the absence of a traditional narrative, it is the space itself, that takes the role of the protagonist, while the camera proposes a narration through its travel and observation.The film Concrete & Samples III Carrara, shows the marble quarry; within its ‘sculpted’ landscape, its temporary architecture and art-historical references form a more radical complement, to the two churches.

The people are missing

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“What has changed?”, asked Gilles Deleuze during one of his talks on “cinema and thought” in 1985, drawing on his theory of the break between two ages based on an ontology of the cinematographic image. “Just as we’ve searched for the differences between the so-called ‘classical’ and ‘modern’ image, we could also search for the differences between the classical political cinema en the modern political cinema. It seems clear to me: there is an obvious change that makes that political cinema today, aside from The Straubs and Resnais, has left the West and North-America and has ended up in the Third World.” Deleuze elaborated on this fundamental change in regards to “political cinema” in Chapter 8 of his second Cinema book (see excerpt below), in which he argued that “if there were a modern political cinema, it would be on this basis: the people no longer exist, or not yet … the people are missing (….) Yet this recognition is no reason for a renunciation of political cinema, but on the contrary the new basis on which it is founded”, not “addressing a people which is presupposed already there”, but “contributing to the invention of a people”. The response to the question “where is the people?”, argued Deleuze, can only be undertaken by the power of “fabulation”: “It is the act of fabulation, let’s say ‘this act too big for me’, that constitutes a people, this is what I was trying to express in regards to Third World cinema: fabulation as a function of the poor or the damned” (talk of 18 June 1985).

It was only towards 1985, around the time when his two Cinema books were first published, that the issue of fabulation (sometimes translated as “story-telling”) appeared in Deleuze’s work. Taking his cue from Bergson, he and Guattari remark in What Is Philosophy? that “Bergson analyzes fabulation as a visionary faculty very different from the imagination and that consists in creating gods and giants, ‘semi- personal powers or effective presences’. It is exercised first of all in religions, but it is freely developed in art and literature.” Looking back, it’s clear that their interpretation of the notion of “fabulation” was preceded and prepared for by the concept of “minor literature”, defined in their book on Kafka (1975) as “positively charged with the role and function of collective, and even revolutionary, enunciation”, and furthermore “’if the writer is in the margins or completely outside his or her fragile community, this situation allows the writer all the more the possibility to express another possible community and to forge the means for another consciousness and another sensibility.“ It was precisely this function that Deleuze recognized in the work of the Canadian filmmaker Pierre Perrault, who became one of the protagonists in Cinema 2: Time-image. Perrault himself preferred to describe his own work as “cinéma du vécu” (living cinema) – as oppossed to “cinéma vérité” (truth cinema) – as a documentary cinema that seeks to seize the moment when one passes from one state to another in the act of what he called “legending”. In other words: “truth” isn’t something already out there to be apprehended – it has to be created. Wary of all predetermined fiction, Perrault was interested in capturing “fiction in flagrante delicto” and in doing so “contribute to the invention of his (Québecois) people.” Perrault argued that neither he nor the characters in his films were capable of producing such ‘legending’ by themselves, for they need one another as “intercessors”. In a 1985 interview Deleuze described Perrault’s function as that of a “mediator”:

“The formation of mediators in a community is well seen in the work of the Canadian filmmaker Pierre Perrault: having found mediators I can say what I have to say. Perrault thinks that if he speaks on his own, even in a fictional framework, he’s bound to come out with an intellectual’s discourse, he won’t get away from a ‘master’s or colonist’s discourse,’ an established discourse. What we have to do is catch someone else ‘legending,’ ‘caught in the act of legending.’ Then a minority discourse, with one or many speakers, takes shape. We here come upon what Bergson calls ‘fabulation’… To catch someone in the act of legending is to catch the movement of constitution of a people. A people isn’t something already there. A people, in a way, is what’s missing, as Paul Klee used to say. Was there ever a Palestinian people? Israel says no. Of course there was, but that’s not the point. The thing is, that once the Palestinians have been thrown out of their territory, then to the extent that they resist they enter the process of constituting a people. It corresponds exactly to what Perrault calls being caught in the act of legending. It’s how any people is constituted. So, to the established fictions that are always rooted in a colonist’s discourse, we oppose a minority discourse, with mediators.”

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Fabulation is thus proposed as the act by which a people that doesn’t yet “exist” as such (re)invents itself. Of course filmmakers can not invent a people, they can only evoke one, through forms of “free indirect discourse” (a notion Deleuze borrowed from Passolini). As Deleuze said in one of his talks, referring to Glauber Rocha’s Terra em Transe: “Rocha has put his country in trance but that’s all he could do. It was his own free indirect discourse but he couldn’t do more – it’s a great work of art but one could still say something is missing: the people is missing.” How then can cinema contribute to political acts of fabulation? What does resistance to established fictions and opposition of a minority discourse entail? Or, in his own words: “what is the relationship between the struggles of man of the work of art?”

“This is the closest and for me the most mysterious relationship of all. Exactly what Paul Klee meant when he said: ‘you know, the people are missing’. The people are missing and at the same time, they are not missing. The people are missing means that the fundamental affinity between a work of art and a people that does not yet exist is not, will never be clear. There is no work of art that does not call on a people who does not yet exist.” (talk of 17 March 1987, also published as What is the Creative Act?)

In a 1990 interview with Antonio Negri, a few years before his death, Deleuze gave some more hints to how this relationship might be thought of:

Negri: “How can minority becoming be powerful? How can resistance become an insur­rection? Reading you, I’m never sure how to answer such questions, even though I always find in your works an impetus that forces me to reformulate the questions theoretically and practically. And yet when I read what you’ve written about the imagination, or on common notions in Spinoza, or when I follow your description in The Time-Image of the rise of revolutionary cine­ma in third-world countries, and with you grasp the passage from image into fabulation, into political praxis, I almost feel I’ve found an answer… Or am I mistaken ? Is there then, some way for the resistance of the oppressed to become effective, and for what’s intolerable to be definitively removed? Is there some way for the mass of singularities and atoms that we all are to come forward as a constitutive power, or must we rather accept the juridical paradox that con­stitutive power can be defined only by constituted power?”

Deleuze: “The difference between minorities and majorities isn’t their size. A minority may be bigger than a majority. What defines the majority is a model you have to conform to: the average European adult male city-dweller, for example… A minority, on the other hand, has no model, it’s a becoming, a process. One might say the majority is nobody. Everybody’s caught, one way or another, in a minority becoming that would lead them into unknown paths if they opted to follow it through. When a minority creates models for itself, it’s because it wants to become a majority, and probably has to, to survive or prosper (to have a state, be recognized, establish its rights, for example). But its power comes from what it’s managed to create, which to some extent goes into the model, but doesn’t depend on it. A people is always a creative minority, and remains one even when it acquires a majority: it can be both at once because the two things aren’t lived out on the same plane. It’s the greatest artists (rather than populist artists) who invoke a people, and find they ‘lack a people’: Mallarme, Rimbaud, Klee, Berg. The Straubs in cinema. Artists can only invoke a people, their need for one goes to the very heart of what they’re doing, it’s not their job to create one, and they can’t. Art is resistance: it resists death, slavery, infamy, shame. But a people can’t worry about art. How is a people created, through what terrible suf­fering? When a people’s created, it’s through its own resources, but in away that links up with something in art (Garrel says there’s a mass of terrible suffering in the Louvre, too) or links up art to what it lacked. Utopia isn’t the right concept: it’s more a question of a ‘fabulation’ in which a people and art both share. We ought to take up Bergson’s notion of fabulation and give it a political meaning”.

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The text below was published in ‘Cinema 2, The Time-Image’ (Athlone Press, 1989), Paragraph 3 of Chapter 8, ‘Cinema, Body and Brain, Thought’. First published as ‘Cinema 2, L’Image-temps’ (Les Editions de Minuit, 1985). Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Caleta (translation slightly modified).

Resnais and the Straubs are probably the greatest political film-makers in the West, in modern cinema. But, oddly, this is not through the presence of the people. On the contrary, it is because they know how to show how the people are what is missing, what is not there. Thus Resnais, in La guerre est finie, in relation to a Spain that will not be seen: do the people in the old central committee stand with the young terrorists or the tired militant? And the German people in the Straubs’ Nicht Versohnt (‘Not reconciled’): has there ever been a German people, in a country which has bungled its revolutions, and was constituted under Bismarck and Hitler, to be separated again? This is the first big difference between classical and modern cinema. For in classical cinema, the people are there, even though they are oppressed, tricked, subject, even though blind or unconscious. Soviet cinema is an example: the people are already there in Eisenstein, who shows them performing a qualitative leap in Staroye i novoye (‘The General Line’ aka ‘Old and New’), or who, in Ivan Grozniy (‘Ivan the Terrible’), makes them the advanced edge held in check by the tsar; and, in Pudovkin, it is on each occasion the progression of a certain awareness which means that the people already has a virtual existence in process of being actualized; and in Vertov and Dovzhenko, in two different ways, there is a unanimity which calls the different peoples into the same melting-pot from which the future emerges. But unanimity is also the political character of American cinema before and during the war: this time, it is not the twists and turns of class struggle and the confrontation of ideologies, but the economic crises, the fight against moral prejudice, profiteers and demagogues, which mark the awareness of a people, at the lowest point of their misfortune as well as at the peak of their hope (the unanimism of King Vidor, Capra, or Ford, for the problem runs through the Western as much as through the social drama, both testifying to the existence of a people, in hardships as well as in ways of recovering and rediscovering itself).(1) In American and in Soviet cinema, the people are already there, real before being actual, ideal without being abstract. Hence the idea that the cinema, as art of the masses, could be the supreme revolutionary or democratic art, which makes the masses a true subject. But a great many factors were to compromise this belief: the rise of Hitler, which gave cinema as its object not the masses become subject but the masses subjected; Stalinism, which replaced the unanimism of peoples with the tyrannical unity of a party; the break-up of the American people, who could no longer believe themselves to be either the melting-pot of peoples past or the seed of a people to come (it was the neo-Western that first demonstrated this break-up). In short, if there were a modern political cinema, it would be on this basis: the people no longer exist, or not yet … the people are missing.

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No doubt this truth also applied to the West, but very few authors discovered it, because it was hidden by the mechanisms of power and the systems of majority. On the other hand, it was absolutely clear in the third world, where oppressed and exploited nations remained in a state of perpetual minorities, in a collective identity crisis. Third world and minorities gave rise to authors who would be in a position, in relation to their nation and their personal situation in that nation, to say: the people are what is missing. Kafka and Klee had been the first to state this explicitly. The first said that minor literatures, “in the small nations”, ought to supplement a “national consciousness which is often inert and always in process of disintegration”, and fulfill collective tasks in the absence of a people; the second said that painting, to bring together all the parts of its “great work”, needed a “final force”, the people who were still missing.(2) This was all the more true for cinema as mass-art. Sometimes the third world film-maker finds himself before an illiterate public, swamped by American, Egyptian or Indian serials, and karate films, and he has to go through all this, it is this material that he has to work on, to extract from it the elements of a people who are still missing (Lino Brocka). Sometimes the minority film-maker finds himself in the impasse described by Kafka: the impossibility of not “writing”, the impossibility of writing in the dominant language, the impossibility of writing differently (Pierre Perrrault encounters this situation in Un pays sans bon sens, the impossibility of not speaking, the impossibility of speaking other than in English, the impossibility of speaking English, the impossibility of settling in France in order to speak French … ), and it is through this state of crisis that he has to pass, it is this that has to be resolved. This acknowledgement of a people who are missing is not a renunciation of political cinema, but on the contrary the new basis on which it is founded, in the third world and for minorities. Art, and especially cinematographic art, must take part in this task: not that of addressing a people, which is presupposed already there, but of contributing to the invention of a people. The moment the master, or the colonizer, proclaims “There have never been people here”, the missing people are a becoming, they invent themselves, in shanty towns and camps, or in ghettos, in new conditions of struggle to which a necessarily political art must contribute.

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There is a second big difference between classical and modern political cinema, which concerns the relationship between the political and the private. Kafka suggested that “major” literatures always maintained a border between the political and the private, however mobile, whilst, in minor literature, the private affair was immediately political and “entailed a verdict of life or death”. And it is true that, in the large nations, the family, the couple, the individual himself go about their own business, even though this business necessarily expresses social contradictions and problems, or directly suffers their effects. The private element can thus become the place of a becoming conscious, in so far as it goes back to root causes, or reveals the “object” that it expresses. In this sense, classical cinema constantly maintained this boundary which marked the correlation of the political and the private, and which allowed, through the intermediary of an awareness, passage from one social force to another, from one political position to another: Pudovkin’s Mat (‘Mother’) discovers the son’s real object in fighting, and takes it over; in Ford’s The Grapes of Wrath, it is the mother who sees clearly up to a certain point, and who is relieved by the son when conditions change. This is no longer the case in modern political cinema, where no boundary survives to provide a minimum distance or evolution: the private affair merges with the social – or political – immediate. In Güney’s Yol, the family clans form a network of alliances, a fabric of relationships so close-knit that one character must marry the wife of his dead brother, and another go far away to look for his guilty wife, across a desert of snow, to have her punished in the proper place; and, in Süru (‘The Herd’) as in Yol, the most progressive hero is condemned to death in advance. It could be said that this is a matter of archaic pastoral families. But, in fact, what is important is that there is no longer a “general line”, that is, of evolution from the Old to the New, or of revolution which produces a leap from one to the other. There is rather, as in South American cinema, a juxtaposition or compenetration of the old and the new which “makes up an absurdity”, which assumes “the form of aberration”.(3) What replaces the correlation of the political and the private is the coexistence, to the point of absurdity, of very different social stages. It is in this way that, in Glauber Rocha’s work, the myths of the people, prophetism and banditism, are the archaic obverse of capitalist violence, as if the people were turning and increasing against themselves the violence that they suffer from somewhere else out of a need for idolization (Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol, ‘Black God and White Devil’). Gaining awareness is disallowed either because it takes place in the air, as with the intellectual, or because it is compressed into a hollow, as with Antonio das Mortes, capable only of grasping the juxtaposition of two violences and the continuation of one by the other.

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What, then, is left? The greatest ‘agitprop’ cinema that has ever been made: the agitprop is no longer a result of a becoming conscious, but consists of putting everything into a trance, the people and its masters, and the camera itself, pushing everything into a state of aberration, in order to communicate violences as well as to make private business pass into the political, and political affairs into the private (Terra em Transe, ‘Earth Entranced’). Hence the very specific aspect assumed by the critique of myth in Rocha: it is not a matter of analysing myth in order to discover its archaic meaning or structure, but of connecting archaic myth to the state of the drives in an absolutely contemporary society, hunger, thirst, sexuality, power, death, worship. In Asia, in Brocka’s work, we can also find the immediacy of the raw drive and social violence underneath the myth, for the former is no more “natural” than the latter is “cultural”.(4) A lived actual which at the same time indicates the impossibility of living can be extracted from myth in other ways, but continues to constitute the new object of political cinema: putting into a trance, putting into a crisis. In Pierre Perrault, it is a matter of a state of crisis and not of trance. It is a matter of stubborn quests rather than of violent drives. However, the aberrant quest for French ancestors (Le regne du jour, Un pays sans bon sens, C’etait un Quebecois en Bretagne) testifies in its own way, beneath the myth of origins, to the absence of boundary between the private and the political, but also to the impossibility of living in these conditions, for the colonized person who comes up against an impasse in every direction.(5) It is as if modern political cinema were no longer constituted on the basis of a possibility of evolution and revolution, like the classical cinema, but on impossibilities, in the style of Kafka: the intolerable. Western authors cannot save themselves from this impasse, unless they settle for a cardboard people and paper revolutionaries: it is a condition which makes Comolli a true political film-maker when he takes as his object a double impossibility, that of forming a group and that of not forming a group, “the impossibility of escaping from the group and the impossibility of being satisfied with it” (L’ombre rouge).(6)

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If the people are missing, if there is no longer consciousness, evolution or revolution, it is the scheme of reversal which itself becomes impossible. There will no longer be conquest of power by a proletariat, or by a united or unified people. The best third world film-makers could believe in this for a time: Rocha’s Guevarism, Chahine’s Nasserism, black American cinema’s blackpowerism. But this was the perspective from which these authors were still taking part in the classical conception, so slow, imperceptible and difficult to site clearly. The death-knell for becoming conscious was precisely the consciousness that there were no people, but always several peoples, an infinity of peoples, who remained to be united, or should not be united, in order for the problem to change. It is in this way that third world cinema is a cinema of minorities, because the people exist only in the condition of minority, which is why they are missing. It is in minorities that private business is immediately political. Acknowledging the failure of fusions or unifications which did not re-create a tyrannical unity, and did not turn back against the people, modern political cinema has been created on this fragmentation, this break-up. This is its third difference. After the 1970s, black American cinema makes a return to the ghettos, returns to this side of a consciousness, and, instead of replacing a negative image of the black with a positive one, multiplies types and ‘characters’, and each time creates or re-creates only a small part of the image which no longer corresponds to a linkage of actions, but to shattered states of emotions or drives, expressible in pure images and sounds: the specificity of black cinema is now defined by a new form, “the struggle that must bear on the medium itself” (Charles Burnett, Robert Gardner, Haile Gerima, Charles Lane).(7) In another style, this is the compositional mode of Chahine in Arab cinema: Iskanderija… lih? (‘Why Alexandria?’) reveals a plurality of intertwined lines, primed from the beginning, one of these lines being the principal one (the story of the boy), the others having to be pushed until they cut across the principal one; and Hadduta misrija (‘An Egyptian Story’ aka al-Dhakira, ‘Memory’) leaves no place for the principal line, and pursues the multiple threads which end in the author’s heart attack, conceived as internal trial and verdict, in a kind of Why Me?, but where the arteries of the inside are in immediate contact with the lines of the outside. In Chahine’s work, the question “why” takes on a properly cinematographic value, just as much as the question “how” in Godard. “Why?” is the question of the inside, the question of the I: for, if the people are missing, if they are breaking up into minorities, it is I who am first of all a people, the people of my atoms as Carmelo Bene said, the people of my arteries as Chahine said (for his part, Gerima says that, if there is a plurality of black “movements”, each film-maker is a movement in himself). “But why?” is also the question from the outside, the question of the world, the question of the people who, missing, invent themselves, who have a chance to invent themselves by asking the I the question that it asked them: Alexandria-I, I-Alexandria. Many third world films invoke memory, implicitly or even in their title, Perrault’s Pour la suite du monde, Chahine’s al-Dhakira, Khleifi’s Al Dhakira al Khasba (‘Fertile Memory’). This is not a psychological memory as faculty for summoning recollections, or even a collective memory as that of an existing people. It is, as we have seen, the strange faculty which puts into immediate contact the outside and the inside, the people’s business and private business, the people who are missing and the I who is absent, a membrane, a double becoming. Kafka spoke of this power taken on by memory in small nations: “The memory of a small nation is no shorter than that of a large one, hence it works on the existing material at a deeper level.” It gains in depth and distance what it lacks in extent. It is no longer psychological nor collective, because each person “in a little country” inherits only the portion due to him, and has no goal other than this portion, even if he neither recognizes nor maintains it. Communication of the world and the I in a fragmented world and in a fragmented I which are constantly being exchanged. It is as if the whole memory of the world is set down on each oppressed people, and the whole memory of the I comes into play in an organic crisis. The arteries of the people to which I belong, or the people of my arteries …

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But is this I not the I of the third world intellectual, whose portrait Rocha and Chahine among others have often sketched, and who has to break with the condition of the colonized, but can do so only by going over to the colonizer’s side, even if only aesthetically, through artistic influences? Kafka pointed to another path, a narrow path between the two dangers: precisely because “great talents” or superior individualities are rare in minor literatures, the author is not in a condition to produce individual utterances which would be like invented stories; but also, because the people are missing, the author is in a situation of producing utterances which are already collective, which are like the seeds of the people to come, and whose political impact is immediate and inescapable. The author can be marginalized or separate from his more or less illiterate community as much as you like; this condition puts him all the more in a position to express potential forces and, in his very solitude, to be a true collective agent, a collective leaven, a catalyst. What Kafka suggests for literature is even more valid for cinema, in as much as it brings collective conditions together through itself. And this is in fact the last characteristic of a modern political cinema. The cinema author finds himself before a people which, from the point of view of culture, is doubly colonized: colonized by stories that have come from elsewhere, but also by their own myths become impersonal entities at the service of the colonizer. The author must not, then, make himself into the ethnologist of his people, nor himself invent a fiction which would be one more private story: for every personal fiction, like every impersonal myth, is on the side of the “masters”. It is in this way that we see Rocha destroying myths from the inside, and Perrault repudiating every fiction that an author could create. There remains the possibility of the author providing himself with “intercessors”, that is, of taking real and not fictional characters, but putting these very characters in the condition of “making up fiction”, of “making legends”, of “fabulation”. The author takes a step towards his characters, but the characters take a step towards the author: double becoming. Fabulation is not an impersonal myth, but neither is it a personal fiction: it is a word in act, a speech-act through which the character continually crosses the boundary which would separate his private business from politics, and which itself produces collective utterances.

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Daney observed that African cinema (but this applies to the whole third world) is not, as the West would like, a cinema which dances, but a cinema which talks; a cinema of the speech-act. It is in this way that it avoids fiction and ethnology. In Ceddo, Ousmane Sembene extracts the fabulation which is the basis of living speech, which ensures its freedom and circulation, which gives it the value of collective utterance, thus contrasting it with the myths of the Islamic colonist.(8) Was this not already Rocha’s way of operating on the myths of Brazil? His internal critique would first isolate a lived present beneath the myth, which could be intolerable, the unbelievable, the impossibility of living now in “this” society (Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol, Terra em Transe); then he had to seize from the unliving a speech-act which could not be forced into silence, an act of fabulation which would not be a return to myth but a production of collective utterances capable of raising misery to a strange positivity, the invention of a people (O Dragão da Maldade Contra o Santo Guerreiro (‘Antonio das Mortes’), Der Leone have sept cabeças (‘The Lion Has Seven Heads’), Cabeças Cortadas (‘Severed Heads’)).(9) The trance, the putting into trances, are a transition, a passage, or a becoming; it is the trance which makes the speech-act possible, through the ideology of the colonizer, the myths of the colonized and the discourse of the intellectual. The author puts the parties in trances in order to contribute to the invention of his people who, alone, can constitute the whole [ensemble]. The parties are again not exactly real in Rocha, but reconstructed (and in Sembene they are reconstituted in a story which goes back to the seventeenth century). It is Perrault, at the other end of America, who addresses real characters, his “intercessors”, in order to prevent any fiction, but also to carry out the critique of myth. Operating by putting into crisis, Perrault will isolate the fabulation speech-act, sometimes as the generator of action (the reinvention of porpoise-fishing in Pour la suite du monde), sometimes taking itself as object (the search for ancestors in Le regne du jour), sometimes bringing about a creative simulation (the elk-hunt in La bete lumineuse), but always in such a way that fabulation is itself memory, and memory is invention of a people. Everything perhaps culminates in Le pays de la terre sans arbres, which brings all the ways together, or, by contrast, in Un pays sans bon sens, which minimizes them (for, here, the real character has the most solitude, and does not even belong to Quebec, but to a tiny French minority in an English country, and leaps from Winnipeg to Paris the better to invent his belonging to Quebec, and to produce a collective utterance for it).(10) Not the myth of a past people, but the fabulation of the people to come. The speech-act must create itself as a foreign language in a dominant language, precisely in order to express an impossibility of living under domination. It is the real character who leaves his private condition, at the same time as the author his abstract condition, to form, between the two, between several, the utterances of Quebec, about Quebec, about America, about Britanny and Paris (free indirect discourse). In Jean Rouch, in Africa, the trance of the maîtres fous is extended in a double becoming, through which the real characters become another by fabulation, but the author, too, himself becomes another, by providing himself with real characters. It may be objected that Jean Rouch can only with difficulty be considered a third world author, but no one has done so much to put the West to flight, to flee himself, to break with a cinema of ethnology and say Moi un Noir, at a time when blacks play roles in American series or those of hip Parisians. The speech-act has several heads, and, little by little, plants the elements of a people to come as the free indirect discourse of Africa about itself, about America or about Paris. As a general rule, third world cinema has this aim: through trance or crisis, to constitute an assemblage which brings real parties together, in order to make them produce collective utterances as the prefiguration of the people who are missing (and, as Klee says, “we can do no more”).

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Notes
(1) For example on democracy, the community and the necessity of a “leader” in King Vidor’s work, cf. Positif, no. 163, novembre 1974 (articles by Michel Ciment and Michael Henry).
(2) cf. Kafka, Journal, 25 December 1911 (and letter to Brod, June 1921); Klee, On Modern Art, trans. Paul Findlay, London: Faber, 1966, p. 55. (“We have found parts, but not the whole. We still lack the ultimate power, for: the people are not with us. But we seek a people. We began over there in the Bauhaus. We began there with a community to which each of us gave what he had. More we cannot do.”) Carmelo Bene has also said: “I make popular theatre. Ethnic. But it is the people who are missing” (Dramaturgie, p. 113).
(3) Roberto Schwarz and his definition of ‘tropicalism’, Les Temps modernes, no. 288, juillet 1970.
(4) On Lino Brocka, his use of myth and his cinema of drives, cf. Cinématographe, no. 77, avril 1982 (especially the article by Jacques Fieschi, ‘Violences’).
(5) On the critique of myth in Perrault, cf. Guy Gauthier, ‘Une ecriture du reel’, and Suzanne Trudel, ‘La quete du royaume, trois hommes, trois paroles, un langage’, in Ecritures de Pierre Perrault, Edilig. Suzanne Trudel distinguishes three kinds of impasse, genealogical, ethnic and political (p. 63).
(6) Jean-Louis Comolli, interview, Cahiers du cinéma, no. 333, mars 1982.
(7) Yann Lardeau, ‘Cinema des racines, histoires du ghetto’, in Cahiers du cinéma, no. 340, octobre 1982.
(8) cf. Serge Daney, La rampe, Cahiers du cinéma / Gallimard, pp. 118- 23 (especially the character of the story-teller).
(9) On Rocha’s critique of myth and the evolution of his work, cf. Barthelemy Amengual, Le cinema novo brésilien, Etudes cinématographiques, II (p. 57: “the counter-myth, as one says counter-fire”).
(10) Ecritures de Pierre Perrault: on real characters, and the speech-act as fabulation function, “flagrant offence of making legend”, cf. the interview with René Allio (on La bête lumineuse, Perrault would say: “I recently came across an unsuspected country … Everything in this apparently quiet country is made into legend as soon as one dares to talk about it.”).

Wisdom of the Surface

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“There is no politics of cinema, there are only singular figures according to which filmmakers apply themselves to bring together the two meanings of the word ‘politics’, with which we can consider a fiction in general and a cinematographic fiction in particular: politics as what a film speaks about – the story of a movement or a conflict, the unveiling of a situation of suffering or injustice, and politics as the strategy of an artistic approach: a way to speed up or slow down time, to diminish or widen space, to match or unmatch look and action, to link or unlink before and after, in and out. We could say: the relation between a matter of justice and a practice of justness. How to think about the way cinema can nowadays put into action the relation between the certainties of injustice, the uncertainties of justice and the calculation of justness?”
— Jacques Rancière

A new book by Jacques Rancière on cinema is always reason to rejoice. Drawing from his experiences related to the cinephile movement in the 1960’s – when he found himself confronted with the tensions between a lingering passion for cinema and an outspoken Marxist worldview – Rancière’s approach to cinema has developed into a highly singular and necessary one, stemming from an interest in the possible relations between a materialism of the mise-en-scène and a global materialism of the world, but also the relations between specific procedures of “sensible” arrangement and what we generally tend to call “cinema” – that what we have come to expect and desire from cinema. For him, these gaps and intervals – “les écarts du cinema”, as his new book is titled – are where the philosophical play is situated. Rancière has never been interested in film analysis or theory in itself: there just is no concept that integrates all the different conceptions of cinema, just as there isn’t a theory that unifies all the problems they pose. With his self-proclaimed position of “amateur” he tries to find a balance between this heterogeneity of cinema and its simultaneous homonymy which paradoxically also lays out a common space to think. It’s in this space where Rancière’s thinking of cinema is situated, always exploring the nodes between different ideas or problems: between cinema and art, cinema and politics, cinema and theory. This amateur position is also an outspoken political one, from which he refutes the authority of specialists and, as in all his work, seeks to reexamine the ways in which the borders of their specific domains intersect or overlay with crossings of experience and knowledge. He writes: “the politics of the amateur affirms that cinema belongs to everyone that has explored the interior of the system of gaps that its name signifies and everyone can take up the authority to trace, between different points of the topography, a singular path that adds to cinema as a world and its knowledge.”

In a way, his conception of philosophy can be considered as cinematographic in itself. Indeed, his work has always been about scanning given landscapes for passage points and transit zones that allow to cut and configure them differently; trying to describe and inscribe particular paths and passages within those landscapes, defined by the coexistence of heterogeneous plans or the connection of opposing points. Isn’t his notion of “partage du sensible” in essence cinematographic too? After all, it deals with a sensibility for the “frame” – what is inside and outside, within and beyond; it deals with with a sensitiveness for the partition of a traversed landscape; with ways of presenting the visible and linking together different sensations and perceptions. The distribution of the sensible is also where his ideas on politics and cinema come together: in the construction of landscapes and ways of seeing that deconstruct consensus and highlight uncovered possibilities and capacities. But at the same time Ranciere has always contradicted the well-spread assumption that this reconfiguration of the landscape can be used as a simple instrument to mobilize militant energies or inform political strategies – an utopian idea that can be traced back to, for example, Vertov, whose work was grounded in a believe that cinema could, in effect, close the gaps between art, life and politics. But once the doomed marriage between communism and cinema was over, writes Rancière,

“the politics of cinema found itself captured in the contradictions that were proper to the expectations of critical art. The view we have on the ambiguities of cinema is in itself marked by the duplicity of what we expect of it: that it gives rise to a certain consciousness due to the clarity of an unveiling, and to a certain energy due to the presentation of a strangeness, that it unveils at the same time all the ambiguity of the world and the way to deal with this ambiguity. We project on it the obscurity of the relation between the clarity of vision and the energy of action. But if cinema can clarify the action, it’s maybe by questioning the self-evidence of that relation.”

In one of the last chapters of Les écarts du cinéma, titled ‘Conversations autour d’un feu’ (first presented in a talk at Centre Pompidou in June 2010) Rancière takes the work of Jean-Marie Straub and Danielle Huillet, in particular their film Dalla nube alla resistenza (From the Cloud to the Resistance) (1979), as a starting point to reflect on how this “questioning” has, over the course of the last decades, taken different forms and attitudes. He writes

“This politics of the communist cantata does not offer us a model of cinematographic politics but a point of reference: the mark of a time when dialectics finds itself scattered from the movement of history that carried it and has to construct a new place for itself, a new distribution of words and gestures, times and spaces; but it is also a fixed point to evaluate the way in which filmmakers have, since that time, wanted to tackle the fractures of history, the shaking up of paths between territories, injustices and new conflicts.”

Dalla nube alla resistenza – based on two works by Cesare Pavese – is not used as an exemplary model, but rather as a significant moment in the thinking of cinema and politics. Rancière indicates three reasons for his choice: first of all, the film ties in with the so-called “Brechtian paradigm”, of which the work of Straub and Huillet is perhaps the most systematic cinematographic form; at the same time, this particular film also represents a sort of turning-point in the dialectical tradition, resulting in a form which Rancière proposes to call “post-Brechtian”; and this critical moment in the work of the two filmmakers also corresponds with a historical juncture: namely, the end of the “leftist” decade, marked by a worldwide diminution of social achievements and revolutionary ideals. Around this period a certain era of cinema-political relations came to an end – characterized by the militant work of Vertov or the Medvedkin Group on the one hand, and historical fresco’s such as Bertolucci’s Novecento on the other. The “post-Brechtian” formula, according to Rancière, thus stands for a certain approach to cinema and politics which is “less focused on the revelation of mechanisms of domination and repression, and more on the examination of the aporia’s of emancipation”.

Rancière’s venture takes him from a thorough analysis of Dalla nube alla resistenza to a juxtaposition with the more recent work of Godard, notably Eloge de l’amour and Notre musique. Although all these films seem to have certain traits in common – reference to the Resistance, confrontation of historical text and place etc. – their take on the Brechtian paradigm has taken different directions, which are manifest in the relations between what is said and what is shown, between the visibility of speaking bodies and the things they are speaking about, between gestures of justness and the intricacy of injustice. According to Rancière, the politics in the work of Straub and Huillet, exemplified by the sixth episode of Dalla nube alla resistenza, situates itself in “the art of arranging bodies that are at the same time capable of phrasing the dialectical force of division and summarize in one single gesture the resistance of justice to all arguments. This resistance itself proves to be visually equal to its contrary: the resistance of nature to all argumentation of just and unjust.” On the other hand, the dialectical play in Godard’s recent work, loaded with irony and nostalgia, is amplified in such a way that it gives way to “a radical impossibility of choosing between injustices”.

Beyond these two singular takes on the post-Brechtian paradigm, Rancière traces contemporary figures of cinema-political relations that, at first sight, couldn’t be further removed from the dialectical tradition. He finds them, for example, in the images of a young girl’s final journey in Bela Tarr’s Satantango – which depicts a figure of resistance which is not unlike the shepherd boy’s stretched arm in Dalla nube alla resistenza, or, for that matter, the stubborness of Bresson’s Mouchette. Tarr’s pessimistic view on the historical breakdown of communism, wrapped in a devastating tale of villains and victims, might have nothing left in common with the communism in Straub and Huillet’s work, but it’s the visual force of this particular resistance, opposing the overwhelming emptiness and deceit in the film, that gives it its political dimension.

“It’s only behind the mises-en-scène that cinema can propose promise or betrayal of a historical experience, there is politics that holds on to the very relationship of the art of moving images with the stories it tells and the process it instructs; there is its way to bring the narrative and dialectic topos to the flat frame of the screen, to the way in which space deploys itself and the light vibrates.”

This tension is evoked in Rancière’s account of Kenji Mizoguchi’s Sanshō Dayũ, telling the story of the family of a governor of a Japanese province, sent into exile because of his stance against oppression. His wife is taken away, his children are sent to the mines. In a particular moving scène, the daughter slowly drowns herself in a lake, in order for her brother to be able to escape, look for their mother and fulfill his promise to free the slaves. For Rancière, this moment indicates a double logic: “on the one hand, cinema participates in the struggle for emancipation, on the other, it disperses into circles on the surface on a lake.” The same double logic is apparent when the son, after freeing the slaves, leaves the battlefield to search for his mother. In the end, the film offers no reparation of the injustices done to them, but there is a final reconciliation of mother and son, filmed in “a slow movement that at the same time assembles and sweeps away, in the serenity of the image, the bodies that the violence of the intrigue has separated.” It’s here, writes Rancière, where all the “écarts” of cinema come together: in this movement in which the film, after demonstrating the struggle for emancipation, finally says: “these are the limits of what i can do. The rest is up to you.”

“The justness of cinema depends on the suspense held between two directions of the moving image: that which opens it to the injustices of the world and that which transforms all intrigue of injustice into vibrations on a surface. It’s in relation to this tension between outside and inside, shared by the classical narrative form (Mizoguchi) and the dialectical form (Straub), that we can think of the becoming of the link between cinema and politics.”

Rancière discusses some recent examples of how this relation between inside and outside, but also the sense of “fiction”, can be challenged. He dedicates a separate chapter to Pedro Costa’s Fontainhas trilogy, in particular No Quarto da Vanda (In Vanda’s Room) and Juventude em Marcha (Colossal Youth), two powerful works whose politics does not lie in dialectical discussion or demonstration, but in finding a way to give back the residents of Fontainhas, an impoverished quarter of Lisbon, all the sensible wealth their world holds. Rancière states: “the wealth of the common world and the capacity of any individual cannot be put in a dialectical formula anymore”. Rather, they deploy themselves under the form of a multiplicity of “condensations” of light and color, bodies and objects, words and silences… all of which function as substitutes, floating on the surface of the screen, “of a great lost art that would be the art of life itself, the art of sharing of sensible wealth and forms of experience.”

Thus, “the politics of cinema plays out in the relation between the ‘documentary’ principle of observation of autonomous bodies and the ‘fictional’ principle of recomposing spaces.” It’s this kind of politics he also sees in Tariq Teguia’s under appreciated Gabbla (Inland), where “fiction”, as defined by Rancière, reveals itself in two ways: in the story of certain invented characters (a topographer, a refugee, a group of militant intellectuals, …) but also as a system of “écarts” between different ways of constituting a territory (Algeria). Here the political project is situated in the confrontation of various spaces, movements across those spaces, and figures of justice, exemplified in the scene where all the main characters are seen traversing the desert. “The dialectical arguments about justice take the form of a confrontation of spaces. And the crossing of those spaces in itself obeys the law that commands the cinematographic fable to declare itself as such, by letting the screen recapture the silhouettes and the trails.”

“This transformation of games of dialectic language of former times in games of space can seem far removed from certain expectations related to the politics of cinema. But in its own way it continues the movement that displaces the theatrical forms of the struggle about justice in two directions: on one hand the manifestation of a capacity of ordinary beings to express the richness of common experience; on the other, the uncertainty of all attempts to ever find the signs of justice on the surface of visible things. if the Straubs’ film is a point of reference, it’s because of the balance it produces between these two movements: first, the cinema passes on to the anonymous the theatrical force of the quarrel on injustice; second, it transforms the quarrel in the projection of luminating images and revokes the pretension of theater to identify itself with life, this pretension that it wages on the reality on speaking bodies in action. Let’s call this cinematographic counter-movement wisdom of the surface. And let us note that today the balance has clearly shifted to the side of this wisdom.”

As he also made clear in his previous writing on “critical art” and the relationship between esthetics and politics, Rancière radically questions and overturns the expectations and presuppositions that come with the notion of politically engaged art and cinema: the believe that there’s a clear line between a way of presenting things and the determination to act; between raising a certain consciousness and provoking political action. But today, the real political power of cinema, according to Rancière, does not lie in conveying outspoken political messages but in what he calls the “wisdom of the surface”.

“Some still hold on strongly to the idea that the political effect of art works depends on the production of well-defined feelings of attraction or repulsion, fury or energy. They still hold on to models of causality that pretend to link modes of perception, forms of knowledge and mobilizing affects; but if they grant these powers to the works, it’s only to make them trip up, to be able to extract a diagnosis of impotence. I think that there is more common power preserved in the wisdom of the surface, in the way in which the issues of justice are weighed according to the imperatives of justness. But also the stories of spaces and trajectories, marchers and journeys can help us to inverse the perspective, to imagine no longer the forms of an art put in the service of political goals but the political forms reinvented on the basis of multiple ways in which the arts of the visible invent gazes, place bodies, making them transform the spaces they traverse.”

Notes on Jacques Rancière, ‘Les écarts du cinéma’, published by La Fabrique Editions. Apologies for the rough translations.

Figures of Dissent

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Notes on cinema and politics

It’s not enough to make political films, films must also be made politically. This dictum by Jean-Luc Godard reflects the longstanding tension between politics and cinema. It’s part of the introduction to his “What is to be done?” manifest from 1970, a sharp-toned piece which references Bertolt Brecht, Dziga Vertov and Vladimir Lenin, summarising the fundamental differences between the two above-mentioned notions in forty points. “For the first”, writes Godard, “it is enough to only open the eyes and the ears. The second means to be militant”. The combative tone illustrates the attitude of the French cinephile milieu at the time, which after the revolutions of May 1968 and the following disenchantments would see the need of taking an outspoken political role, parallel to a growing realisation that cinema – their idea of cinema –had become a shadow of what it once had been, or could have been. This was the time during which Godard and the editorial staff at Cahiers du Cinéma sought solace in Maoism; a short-lived impulse that would later be dismissed as “naive”, but which is indicative of the perceived failure of the great utopias that had characterised French left-wing thinking since the Liberation. The Prague Spring, Salvador Allende’s “Chilean experiment” and the Soviet version of communism had all failed and the idea of revolution seemed to be reduced to a selling slogan in the capitalist mindset. What was left was a great open void that seemed to be filled with nothing but bursts of violence, trivialisation and narcissism. The existing theoretical paradigms did not stand a chance: the interventions in the dialectic between ideology and representation, that had dominated the pages of Cahiers du Cinéma for years, came to nothing. The tragic events of the time demanded other forms of action and reflection, which more than ever needed to be directed to exploring and cultivating the political potential of cinema. In his first article as editor in chief of Cahiers in 1973 Serge Daney wrote: “For film-makers of all leanings, in this near-open battle, in their very craft of film-making, a single problem emerges: How can political statements be presented cinematically? How can they be made positive?”.

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The critical attention of Daney and many others close to Cahiers, did not go out to the verification of the effectiveness of a given “militant” cinema (“all films are militant films”) but to the exploration of the relation between filmmaker and filmed subject. The favoured term was “point de vue” (point of view), which was interpreted in at least two different ways: on the one hand, as the application of a political discourse – which thus already exists before the film is made; on the other hand, as the position taken by the filmmaker, his crew and equipment during the shooting. In the context of a demonstration, a politically committed filmmaker will for instance always film from within the crowd, with the camera among the limbs, the flags and the cries of the demonstrators, contrary to the police or television, who tend to film the crowd from above (as if in order to count or – imaginary – machine-gun). The temptation was always high to dismiss that fundamental distinction as “political”, an argument that doesn’t hold up. What is here at stake is a question of morality: is the filmmaker aware of the camera’s power of intervention, interference and provocation? Can he be truthful to his ideas and yet be respectful to the images that he has made? This accent on the idea of the “point de vue” aligns with the long-time cinephile tradition of Cahiers du Cinéma, based on the idea that each cinematographic work represents a voice and a standpoint, a vision of the world that at the same time legitimises and organises the work. It is not enough to simply emphasize what is being told in a film, it is at least as important to lay bare where, when and by whom it is told. There can be no “énoncé” (statement) without “énonciation” (enunciation). In other words, the unquestioning belief in the intrinsic power of an idea is under no circumstances enough to settle a (political or ideological) argument. In Daney’s words: “We have to know that today the struggle must encompass point of view as well as choice of subject. As our Italian comrades of La Commune remind us: ‘It is not enough to counter the false statements of the bourgeoisie. In and through our own statements we must convey a different view of the world.”

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In the light of this understanding of the notions of politics and cinema, the traditional distinctions between documentary and fiction can no longer be sustained – the “framing” of reality always implies a form of fiction – but neither can the distinction between “mise en scène” (as in: staged, constructed) and the so called “direct” filmmaking (as in: from “real” life). For Daney, “bourgeoisie does not only hold the monopole of the images of reality, it also has the monopole of the mise en scène of that reality. A city, a film theatre, a public space… are already ‘mises en scène’. There is already a given use of time and space that is laid out by obligatory paths to be followed, thresholds, out of bounds”. There is no “real” world, only a configuration of what is established as real, a system of coordinates that philosopher Jacques Rancière refers to as a “police order”: an order of bodies that defines what we do and what we don’t, and assigns those bodies to a particular place and function. It is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that one speech is understood as discourse and another as noise. It’s this “mise en scène”, more powerful because we are barely aware of it, that inevitably predetermines and conditions how and what to behold and film. The opposite of a mise en scène is thus not a pure, non-manipulated, direct take, but another mise en scène. The opposite of a direct take is not a mise en scène, but another take. “Another” in the sense that it makes a new perception possible. “Another” in the sense that the filmmaker takes a new position – spatially, morally, politically – in regards to what he films. It’s here that the potential of true politics resides: in breaking with the self-evidence of the “natural” order – that pushes people and things to certain positions, pins them down on a determinate time and space, assigns them to specific ways of being, seeing and saying – by reframing the given mise en scène, in search for alternative partitions of time and space, new configurations of the visible and the invisible, of speech and noise. Rancière has a word for this: dissensus.

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The greatest danger of our time, according to Rancière, is consensus. The term does not simply mean the agreement of political parties or social partners about the common interests of a community, it implies the resolute abolition of every form of political subjectivity, of every possibility of breaking through the dominant categories of classification and identification. By objectivising the conditions of any possible collective situation, every dispute is fundamentally neutralised: what is left are endless arguments over the administration and configuration of who and what has already been given a place and function. In other words, consensus is what reduces politics to police. Consensus, as a form of government, reduces the role of the state to that of regulating and controlling identities, space and movements, a stalemate which is greatly determined by the global economical order. As states have less control over the circulation of capital, they fall back on what is still within their power: the circulation of persons. This control, in permanent conflict with all the identities that it has not created itself, is today not only one of the principal tasks of the state; it is becoming its essential raison d’être. The recent hardening of immigration policies in many European countries and its resulting forms of stigmatisation and discrimination illustrate what has grown to become the ultimate trading mark of the consensual state: the management of (in)security. Only in the moments when the ranks are broken, when those who don’t have the right to speak raise their voices (“Nous ne sommes pas en trop, nous sommes en plus” – “We are not surplus, but a plus”), when those who don’t count make their existence known (“On est ici, on est d’ici” – “We are here, we are from here”), on those moments when the dreadful contradictions and logics of the dominant order are brought to light, only then politics becomes possible. In that sense politics always implies resistance. A resistance that is born in the refusal to accept the place that has been assigned to people and things. Politics assumes dissensus: two worlds in one.

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Politics situates itself not in the administration and the demonstration of the apparatus of power but in the gestures, glimpses and cries of those who are not recognised by the same apparatus. It’s in this intersection of politics and aesthetics that the work of French filmmaker Sylvain George is to be found: in the struggle of the “nouveaux damnés” (“the new damned”), trapped between the rule and the exception: the outcasts, the unemployed, the “sans papiers”, the young with no voice and even less perspectives; they who are regarded within the dominant socio-political order as “surplus”: included but not belonging. But George is not the sort of filmmaker to embellish his sympathy with an overflow of commentary and explanation, nor to fall into a pedagogical ceremony of misery and sorrow. Instead of organizing his formal strategies around the worn out strategies of causality and narrative, structure and texture are put in the service of allegorical examinations where people and things have their full potential restored. Rancière writes that cinema “must agree to be the surface upon which the experience of people relegated to the margins of economic circulations and social trajectories try to be ciphered in new figures”. It is not the task of art and cinema to endorse the self-evidence of the “real”, but to seize the relation between reality and signification, between appearing and being. In the words of filmmaker Philippe Garrel, there is certainly “a solidarity between real artists and revolutionaries, because they both refuse ordinary identifications.” In the films of George representation tears itself off from itself, in search for new figurations, new trajectories between what we see and what we know. Fable-like figures, worn faces, burned hands: the body constantly takes up the space of the image, but always resisting recognition, always on the verge of disappearance. It is the perceptible tension between the visible and the invisible, presence and absence, individual and collective, that leads us to a confrontational awareness: here is life.

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“Ce qui n’a jamais été vu, n’est pas reconnu” (“What hasn’t been seen, cannot be recognised”) wrote once Daney. The consequence is clear: “on a un manque d’image” (“we have a shortage of images”). The problem is not, as it’s generally considered, that there are too many images; on the contrary: there can never be enough. The problem is that there are too few images that contest the dominant mise en scène, too few that give visibility to what is ignored by the dominant order; too many of the same, too little of the “other”. It’s not that there are no images of grief, violence, injustice and revolt; on the contrary, we get to see them regularly in the countless news reports and current affairs television shows self-evidently presenting us the state of the world. But they are always overshadowed by the faces and the voices of those who fabricate the news, those who speak with authority, the newsmakers, politicians and specialists. These are their images: their effigies that validate their words, their selection of visibilities that their words designate as relevant and in turn validate the same words. It isn’t that we don’t get to see any suffering or struggling people. But what we see are far too often bodies without a name, too many faces that do not return the gaze that we direct at them, too many voices that are spoken about, but who don’t get the chance to speak themselves. What Sylvain George’s images do is let these bodies speak for themselves: words of fire and dream, gestures of rage and despair. The spontaneous outbursts of resistance in a Paris neighbourhood in N’entre pas sans violence (2007), the voicing of hope and desperation in the harbour city of Calais in Qu’ils reposent en révolte (des figures de guerre) (2010): these are the stories of a few, who stand for the stories of many. For if there is something that we should retain, this is it: everyone has a story.

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“Aesthetisising” is a grievance often heard referring to the portrayal of misery. Making “beautiful” images in the light of the intolerable can only indicate indifference, or even worse, a gesture of “populism”. This line of thinking is the consequence of using simplistic oppositions between wealth and misery, between passivity and involvement, between what is given and what is seized. The question of aesthetics is not a matter of choosing a certain formula in order to grasp the hard “reality”. It’s a question of searching for a relation to the configuration of space and the rhythm of time, a question of experiencing and grasping the energy that space and time hold, a question of “point de vue”. This is the attitude that is imbedded in Sylvain George’s images. There is no trivial formalism hidden in the way he pays attention to the wealth of the landscapes surrounding the refugees in Qu’ils reposent en révolte; there is no cheap populism hidden in the patience with which he listens to their stories. Everything that is seized, is given back: the misery of the world, the power of speech, the possibility of resistance. This is a poetry of exchange that is also present in the films of American filmmaker Robert Fenz. His work displays a conviction that the real is not a “given”, the real can only be “framed”. That’s why the inclination to naturalism is foreign to him, as it would only be a confirmation of the dominating mise en scène. The challenge is to break though this order, to disclose it, to fracture it. “Realism must always be won”, according to Daney. Hence Robert Fenz’s preferred use of grainy black&white 16mm film, against the naturalistic impulses of the audiovisual industry. Hence his restless passion for the frame – the passion of a cameraman who understands that filming amounts to choosing. The frame, in André Bazin’s words, is a “mask”, hiding all what happens outside of it. But in Fenz’s films, the frame is much more than a delimitation of the visible: it’s an invitation to the invisible.

fenzsmall4.jpgMeditations on Revolution (1997- 2003) is the title of a series of films that represent the heart of Fenz’s oeuvre. “Revolution” does not refer here to the overthrow of a form of state, but to the countless nameless revolutions inscribed in rural and urban spaces, steeped in hollowed and smiling faces, dancing on the rhythms of a world in constant transition. “Revolution” takes here the form of a sensible world. A dance lesson in the bustling streets of Havana, children playing in a shanty town in Rio de Janeiro, the hard-trained torso of a boxer in Greenville, Mississippi, the proud but fatigued monologue of a jazz musician (the late Marion Brown) in New York: the politics of Fenz’s films does not lie in lecturing on economical or geo-political issues, but in the reframing of bodies, the world they live in and the place that they take in that world. Politics resides in the confrontation of power and impotence, reality and possibility, inside and outside, “here” and “there”. It lies in the way films are made. “Say how things are real”, as Godard proclaims, is what making political films implies. Making films politically: “to say how things really are”.

Sylvain George and Robert Fenz are two of the “Artists in Focus” on the Courtisane Festival 2011.

Translated from Dutch by María Palacios Cruz
Images are taken from various films by Robert Fenz and Sylvain George

Change the World

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Are we in a time of riots? Below you’ll find a rough translation of Daniel Fischer’s transcription of the 19 January 2011 session of Alain Badiou’s seminar Que signifie « changer le monde » ? (What does “change the world” mean?), as found on Jonathon Collerson’s blog. “It is not something Badiou has written out. Nevertheless, it gets across his, apparently, impromptu comments on Tunisia, riots and revolution. It appears that Badiou correctly places the riot at the gateway of revolution and, in calling Tunisia “the weakest link” (Lenin re. Russia 1917), correctly notes the beginning of massive change in the Middle East. Daniel Fischer’s excellent notes are great resource on Badiou’s developing thought.”

Today I’ll talk to you about the riots in Tunisia. We won’t leave the subject of this year’s seminar — What does “change the world” mean? – an expression whose ambiguous character I’ve already described to you.

If by “riots” we mean the street actions of people who want to overthrow the government by means of varying levels of violence, we must at once emphasise what makes these Tunisian riots rare: they have been victorious. A regime seemed securely in place for 23 years and here it is overturned by a popular action which, ipso facto, retroactively establishes it as the “the weakest link”. Why should we analyse this phenomenon, when we could just let ourselves rejoice? A vague uneasiness makes itself felt in the requisitely contented character, let’s call it a consensual character, that must be displayed in spite of the inherent illegality of the events concerned. Today it isn’t easy to declare: “I love Ben Ali, I’m truly heartbroken that he must leave power.” When one says that, one finds oneself in a very bad position. The reason we must pay tribute to minister Alliot-Marie, who publicly regretted her delay in putting the “know-how” of the French police force at the service of Ben Ali, is that she expressed aloud what her political colleagues only whispered. Next to her, Sarkozy is a hypocrite and a coward. Just as everyone, Right and Left, who, in only a few weeks, were congratulating themselves on having Ben Ali as a solid bulwark against Islamism and an excellent pupil of the West, are today forced, because of a consensus of opinion, to pretend to rejoice in his departure, tail between legs.

Once again: a government overthrown by popular violence (and in particular by the young, who spearheaded it) is a rare event for which you must go back thirty years if you want to find a comparable precedent, namely to the Iranian Revolution (1979)*. Thirty years during which the dominant conviction was that such events were no longer really possible. The thesis of “the end of history” made this claim. That thesis obviously didn’t mean that nothing more would happen: “the end of history” meant “the end of events in history [l’événementialité historique]“, the end of a moment where the organisation of power could be overthrown in favour of, as Trotsky said, “the masses entering on the stage of history”. The normal course of things was the alliance of the market economy and parliamentary democracy, an alliance that was the only tenable norm of the general subjectivity. Such is the meaning of the term “globalisation”: this subjectivity became global subjectivity. Furthermore, this wasn’t incompatible with punitive wars (Iraq, Afghanistan), civil wars (in dysfunctional African states), repression of the Palestinian Intifada, &c. So what is fascinating above all else in the Tunisian events is their historicity, they demonstrate that the capacity to create new forms of collective organisation is intact.

The ensemble formed by the market economy and parliamentary democracy, an ensemble given as an insuperable norm, I propose to name: “the West” – and this is what it calls itself. Among the other names in circulation, we note “international community”, “civilisation” (where it is opposed to, as its right, the diverse forms of barbarism, cf. the expression “clash of civilisations”), “Western powers” … Remember that more than thirty years ago the only group who claimed this name — “Occident” — as their standard was a small group of fascists weilding iron bars (with whom I had to deal in my youth). That a name’s referent can change so dramatically can only mean that the world itself has changed. The world no longer has the same transcendental.

Are we in a time of riots?

You could think that, seeing recent events in Greece, Iceland, England, Thailand (the coloured shirts), the hunger riots in Africa, the considerable workers’ riots in China. Also in France, there is something like a pre-riot tension; through phenomena like the factory occupations, people are on the verge of accepting riots.

As an explanation, there is of course the systemic crisis of capitalism that became visible two or three years ago (and is far from finished) with its procession of social impasse, poverty, and the growing feeling that the system is not viable nor as magnificent as was previously said; the vacuity of political regimes has become manifest, service to the economic system is their only purpose (the “save the banks” episode was particularly demonstrative), which contributes greatly to their discrediting. In the same period, and precisely because they are the operators of systemic survival, states have taken dramatically reactionary measures in more and more areas (railways, post, schools, hospitals…).

I’d like to try and locate these phenomena in the framework of a historical periodisation. In my opinion, the rioters’ disposition arises in interval periods [périodes intervallaires]. What is an interval period? There is a sequence in which revolutionary logic is clarified and where it explicitly presents itself as an alternative, succeeded by an interval period where the revolutionary idea has not been passed on to anyone [déshérence], and in which it hasn’t yet been taken up, a new alternative disposition has not yet been formed. During such periods the reactionaries can say, precisely because the alternative is impaired, that things have returned to their natural course. Characteristically, this is what happened in 1815 with the restorers of the Holy Alliance. In interval periods, discontent exists but it can’t be structured because it is unable to draw its force from a shared idea. Its power is essentially negative (“make them go away”). This is why the form of mass collective action in an interval period is the riot. Take the period 1820-1850: it was a grand period of riots (1830, 1848, the revolt of the Canuts of Lyon); but it doesn’t mean they were sterile, they were haphazard [aveugle] but very fertile. The great global political orientations that were the hinge [vertébré] of the next century emerge from that period. Marx says it well: the French workers’ movement was one of the sources of his thought (beside German philosophy and English political economy).

What are the criterion for evaluating riots?

The particular problem of the riot, in as much as it calls state power into question, is that it exposes the state to political change (the possibility of its collapse), but it doesn’t embody this change: what is going to change in the state is not prefigured in the riot. This is the major difference with a revolution, which in itself proposes an alternative. That is the reason why, invariably, rioters have complained that a new regime is identical to an old one (it’s model, after the fall of Napoleon III, is the constitution on 4 September of a regime made up of the old political staff). Notice that the party, of the type [concept] that was created by the RSDLP then by the Bolsheviks, is a structure explicitly designed to constitute itself as an alternative power in place of the state. When the figure of the rioter becomes a political figure, i.e. when it has in itself the political body that it needs and recourse to an inveterate politics [aux vieux chevaux de la politique] becomes useless, we can say that that moment there is the end of the interval period.

To return to the Tunisian riot, it is very likely that it is itself going to continue – and divide itself – by proclaiming that the figure of power that will be in place is so disconnected from the popular movement that it doesn’t want it either. On what criteria, then, can we evaluate the riot? In the first place, one must have a definite empathy towards the riot, this is an absolutely necessary condition. Another criterion is the recognition of its negative power, the hated power collapses at least symbolically. But what is affirmed? The Western press has already responded by saying that what was expressed there was a desire for the West. What we can affirm is that a desire for liberty is involved and that such a desire is without debate a legitimate desire under a regime both despotic and corrupt as was that of Ben Ali. How this desire as is a desire for the West is very uncertain.

It must be remembered that the West as a power has so far given no proof that it cares in any way at all about organising liberty in the places where it intervenes. The account of the West is: “are you walking with me or not?”, giving the expression “walk with me” a signification internal to the market economy,** if necessary in collaboration with counter-revolutionary police. “Friendly countries” like Egypt or Pakistan are just as despotic and corrupt as was Tunisia under Ben Ali, but we’ve heard little expressed about it from those who have appeared, on the occasion of the Tunisian events, as ardent defenders of liberty.

How can we define a popular movement as reducible to “a desire for the West”? We could say, and this definition applies to any country, that it involves a movement that realises itself in the figure of the anti-despotic rioter whose negative and popular power takes the form of the crowd and whose affirmative power has no other norm than those the West invokes. A popular movement meeting this definition has every chance of ending in elections and there is no reason for another political perspective to develop. I claim that at the end of such a process, we will have witnessed the phenomena of Western inclusion. For what we call the Western press, this phenomena is the ineluctable result of the riot’s development.

If it is true that, as Marx predicted, the space where emancipatory ideas are realised is a global space (which, incidentally, wasn’t the case with the revolutions of the Twentieth Century), then the phenomena of Western inclusion cannot be part of genuine change. What would genuine change be? It would be a break with the west, a “dewesternisation”, and would take the form of an exclusion. A dream, you are thinking; but it is precisely a dream typical of an interval period like ours.

If there were a different evolution than the evolution toward Western inclusion, what could that attest to? No formal response can be given here. We can simply say there is nothing in the analysis of the state’s process which, through long and torturous necessity, will eventually result in elections. What is required is a patient and careful inquiry among the people, in search of that which, after an inevitable process of division (because it is always the Two that carries a truth, and not the One), will be carried by a fraction of the movement, namely: declarations [des énoncés]. What is stated can by no means be resolved within Western inclusion. If they are there, these declarations, they will be easily recognisable. It is under the condition of these new declarations that the development of the organisation of figures of collective action can be conceived.

We return, to conclude, to empathy. The lesson to draw from the Tunisian events, the minimal lesson, is that what appears as unfailing stable can itself in the end collapse. And that is reassuring, very reassuring (Et ça, ça fait plaisir, et même très plaisir).

— Badiou ended the lecture with a poem by Bertold Brecht’s “In Praise of Dialectics”:

Today, injustice goes with a certain stride,
The oppressors move in for ten thousand years.
Force sounds certain: it will stay the way it is.
No voice resounds except the voice of the rulers

And on the markets, exploitation says it out loud:
I am only just beginning.

But of the oppressed, many now say:
What we want will never happen

Whoever is still alive must never say ‘never’!
Certainty is never certain.
It will not stay the way it is.

When the rulers have already spoken
Then the ruled will start to speak.
Who dares say ‘never’?

Who’s to blame if oppression remains? We are.
Who can break its thrall? We can.

Whoever has been beaten down must rise to his feet!
Whoever is lost must fight back!
Whoever has recognized his condition – how can anyone stop him?
Because the vanquished of today will be tomorrow’s victors
And never will become: already today!

(Translation: David Riff)

* The fall of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe 20 years ago is not comparable. They fell with the consent of the USSR, this was symbolised in a meeting between the East German leader Honecker and his Russian guardians: when he asked their permission to fire on the crowd (a necessary step for him), he was refused this permission. Change to the communist power structure was made by the same apparatchiks who installed themselves at the head of what remained of their system before it imploded.

** [trans.] The French verb ‘to walk’ is marcher and the French for Market Economy is l’économie de marché; Badiou is playing on marcher and marché here.